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An Exploratory Analysis of Managerial Perceptions of Social and Environmental 




 Owing substantially to a shift in governmental policy away from economic growth at all 
costs (See, 2009), Chinese corporations have begun to exhibit increased interest in both 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the disclosure of social and environmental information.  
With respect to the latter, Guan and Yu (2011) note, for example, while only a handful of 
Chinese listed companies issued standalone CSR reports as recently as 2005, by 2009 the 
number had grown to nearly 600.  However, several studies (e.g., Ane, 2012; Zeng et al., 2010; 
Guan and Yu, 2011) of social and environmental reporting (SER) in China document that, in 
general over the mid-to-late 2000s, the quality of the reporting was poor. 
 While the growth of CSR reporting in China in recent years is well-documented, little is 
known about the managerial perceptions of the practice.  Studies of SER in more developed 
economies indicate that a variety of institutional pressures often play a role in its adoption and 
development, and in this study, we attempt to determine how managers of CSR reporting 
companies in China perceive pressures for the practice, and we interpret these through a neo-
institutional lens (Bebbington et al., 2009; Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2007).  Given the unique status 
and relation to the government of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we focus in this exploratory 
investigation exclusively on these types of organizations.  Further, due to the differing cultural 
and industrialization environments across the regions of China (Redfern and Crawford, 2010), 
we further limit our examination to companies headquartered in Beijing.  Finally, in addition to 
identifying managerial perceptions of the pressures regarding SER practices, we also attempt to 
better understand the poor quality of the reporting by seeking managers’ perceptions of the 
3 
 
purpose for the disclosure.  Our interview data were collected in 2009, the height of the SER 
growth period in China. 
 This study adds to the social and environmental accounting body of knowledge in two 
important ways.  First, this is the first study to investigate Chinese managers’ perceptions of the 
pressures for SER, and in addition to allowing for a better understanding of the factors that 
appear to influence the practice in a non-Westernized setting, the analysis also adds to the 
growing body of research exploring SER from a neo-institutional perspective.  Importantly, we 
find that, in spite of the differing Chinese context, managers perceive varying degrees of 
institutional pressures, a finding consistent with SER in more developed economies (see, e.g., 
Bebbington et al., 2009).  Interestingly, and in contrast to recent explorations of institutional 
change outside of the SER domain (e.g., Ezzamel et al., 2012), our interview data suggests 
considerable homogeneity with respect to managerial responses to the change in logics.  We 
speculate that this may be due to both our specific focus on SOEs in Beijing, as well as the 
somewhat unique social and political nature of the Chinese setting.  Second, our exploration of 
how Chinese managers perceive the purpose of SER helps to explain the low reporting quality 
documented in earlier studies of the practice, and perhaps more importantly, may help identify 
changes that might be necessary to ultimately improve the disclosure.  We begin with 
background on the differing Chinese context regarding SER.  
Background 
SER in the Chinese Context  
 The Chinese economy differs in substantial ways from those of more developed Western 
countries.  Tang and Li (2009, p. 202), for example, note that until the launch of the ‘Open Door’ 
policy in the late-1970s, “almost all Chinese corporations were collectively owned and tightly 
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controlled by the state.”  However, the last three decades have seen the development of a 
socialist market economy where, according to Noronha et al. (2013, p. 31), “the market plays a 
primary role in allocating resources under the government’s macro-regulation.”  A key aspect of 
the market transformation was the move to shift many of the governmental entities into publicly 
traded state-owned enterprises with the goal of faster economic development (Gao, 2011).  
Noronha et al. (2013) note the success of the transformation in that China’s GDP increased 
substantially over the 30 years following the market reforms, and its economy is projected to be 
the largest in the world by 2040.  However, the economic growth did not come without social 
and environmental costs.  Tang and Li (2009, p. 199) identify that, among other issues, concerns 
with the use of ‘slave labor’, the safety of pet food and toys exported from China, and 
environmental pollution problems have come to the forefront over the past few years.1 
 Although the concept of corporate social responsibility has been slowly taking root in 
China since the country joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 (Gao, 2011), it wasn’t until 
the middle of the decade that substantial attention was paid to the topic. As noted by Marquis and 
Qian (2014, p. 129), the Chinese government, since its creation in 1949, has articulated its 
priorities through a series of five-year plans, and they highlight the important shift apparent in 
the 11th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development issued in 2006.  
Released under the administration of Hu Jintao, the plan encouraged a national vision based on 
the principles of a harmonious society and scientific development, and, this, according to See 
(2009, p. 1), was “perceived to be a departure from an economic growth at all cost model to one 
in which economic growth is balanced against the urgent need to tackle pressing societal and 
environmental problems existing in China.”  
                                                
1 Tang and Li (2009) identify, for example, that the New York Times ran a series of feature articles in 2007 exploring 
the ecological issues driven by China’s economic growth. 
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 Both Marquis and Qian (2014) and Noronha et al. (2013) state that, in addition to placing 
pressures on companies to improve their CSR activities, a major focus of the shifting Chinese 
priorities was on encouraging corporate SER.  Noronha et al. (2013, pp. 33-35) identify nearly a 
dozen different documents issued since 2006 by organizations including the Ministry of Finance, 
the State Environmental Protection Administration of  China, and both the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai Stock Exchanges, either encouraging, or in theory, requiring aspects of social and 
environmental disclosure.2  Perhaps not surprisingly, given the state emphasis on the practice, 
SER has grown dramatically in China in recent years.  For example, while Gao (2011) indicates 
only six CSR reports were published by listed firms in 2005, Guan and Yu (2011) identify that 
189 companies published one in 2008 and that the number ballooned to 582 the following year. 
 Unfortunately, while the uptake of SER by Chinese listed firms grew dramatically over 
the 2006 to 2009 period, Guan and Yu (2011) claim that the quality of the disclosure is low in 
that most reports fail to embrace international reporting standards and few include meaningful 
indicators.  Other recent studies investigating SER in China over the later 2000s, although 
focusing more specifically on just environmental disclosure, document similar concerns with 
quality.  For example, Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) examine a sample of 175 listed Chinese firms 
and measure the extent of environmental disclosure included in annual reports, standalone CSR-
type reports, and company websites for the year 2006.  Using a content analysis metric weighted 
for disclosure quality3 and converted to a percentage score, they report that the firms, on average, 
achieved only 28.8 percent of the possible points.  Also investigating the provision of 
environmental information through both annual reports and standalone CSR reports, Yu et al. 
                                                
2 For example,  Marquis and Qian (2014, p. 145) identify that over 30 percent of the companies that were technically 
required to issue CSR reports by either the Shenzhen or Shanghai Stock Exchanges failed to do so.   
3 Similar to Wiseman’s (1982) weighting scheme, Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) award one point for general 




(2011) examine a larger sample of publicly traded firms and focus on reporting in 2008 and 
2009.  Based on 445 manufacturing companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Yu et al. 
(2011), consistent with Liu and Anbumozhi (2009), report low disclosure scores overall (a mean 
score of 3.7 out of a possible 13).4 
 The substantial increase in the use of CSR reporting by Chinese corporations, particularly 
in conjunction with the findings that the reporting quality is low, presents an interesting 
opportunity to better understand the process by exploring how managers of disclosing firms 
perceive the pressures leading to, and the purposes for, the reporting.  We believe that examining 
this issue through the lens of neo-institutional theory (see, e.g., Bebbington et al., 2009; 
Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2007) can shed light on the practice, and we turn to an overview of that 
theory as it applies to SER.  
Neo-Institutional Theory 
 
 Neo-institutional theory is based on the premise that organizations act in response to 
various pressures from their institutional environments and adopt organizational structures and 
management practices that are considered to be the appropriate choice by broader society and 
that are considered legitimate by other organizations in their field, regardless of their actual 
usefulness (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001). This 
basic premise of neo-institutional theory proposes a standardization to, and harmonization with, 
certain predominant norms (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Carpenter & 
Feroz, 2001, Tagesson, 2007). Essentially, the theory highlights the relationship between 
organizations and the environment within which they operate.  While taking into account 
legitimacy and stakeholder concerns, neo-institutional theory expands the focus from the 
                                                
4 Studies focusing on either annual report or web-based disclosure of social and environmental information by 
Chinese firms over the later 2000s (e.g., Ane, 2012; Tang and Li, 2009; Zeng et al., 2010) similarly find low levels 
of reporting quality. 
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rational, resource-dependence perception common in the social and environmental accounting 
literature (see, e.g., Deegan, 2002; Milne & Patten, 2002) to a more subtle form which is 
influenced by a mixture of factors more complex than deliberate managerial decision-making. 
Neo-institutional theory provides an alternative, albeit complementary, perception of various 
social dynamics to explore how different institutional factors, such as coercive, mimetic and 
normative isomorphism, influence organizational practices.  As argued by Bebbington et al. 
(2009, p. 589), ‘institutional approaches tend to move away from considering organizational 
activities as something managers purposely initiate to achieve carefully considered outcomes, 
and focus instead on the shaping effects of social pressure.” 
 With respect to SER, Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2007, p. 155) argues that the practice “could 
become institutionalized, determining to some extent the choice of organizations in terms of 
whether or not to publish a [CSR] report and how to publish it.”  He further claims it is a 
combination of coercive, normative, and mimetic structures and activities that describe “what 
type of reporting is produced, by who, for whom and with what assumed purpose” (Larrinaga-
Gonzalez, 2007, p. 155).5  Following Scott (1995), Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2007, p. 155) defines 
the coercive pillar as based on “rule-setting, monitoring, recompense and punishment,” and he 
notes that it includes factors such as the enforcement of legislation or the exercise of power.  
Normative pressures, according to Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2007) result from values and norms, and  
he further cites DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) argument that professionalization, formal 
education and professional networks help to create normative isomorphism.  Finally, Larrinaga-
Gonzalez identifies imitation (mimetic processes) as the third pillar of institutional isomorphism.  
                                                
5 Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2007) actually uses the term ‘regulative’ rather than ‘coercive’ and ‘cognitive’ as opposed to 
‘mimetic’ although he notes that they represent the same general neo-institutional constructs and are based on the 
difference in word choice across DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Scott (1995). 
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He notes that “organizations imitate those peer organizations that seem to be more successful and 
legitimate” (Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2007, p. 159).      
 While most investigations of SER in the accounting domain tend to adopt either a 
legitimacy theory or stakeholder theory perspective, a growing body of work relies on neo-
institutional theory arguments.  For example, Kolk (2005) examines changes in environmental 
reporting across Global 250 companies from Europe, Japan, and the U.S. and argues that the 
increases in the first two regions in comparison to the third are a reflection of differing levels of 
governmental encouragement, as well as a less litigious societal tradition.  Focusing on a 
different aspect of institutional pressure, Cormier et al. (2005) explore variation in environmental 
disclosure quality for a sample of German firms and claim that differences, while partially owing 
to economic incentives and public pressures, also appear to be a function of both imitation and 
routine.  
 In contrast to the quantitative analyses of Kolk (2005) and Cormier et al. (2005), 
Herremans et al. (2009) rely on both archival and interview-based data to examine changes in 
environmental reporting6 for a sample of Canadian petroleum companies in response to changing 
societal concerns with the industry’s environmental performance.  Herremans et al. (2009, p. 
455) document that the firms tended to split into separate camps designated by the authors as 
‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ and that a perceived difference in institutional pressures appeared to 
explain the division.  They note “leading firms generally operate in a more international context 
more attuned to changing social expectations,” while laggards “attended only to selected signals 
from their immediate geographic context (e.g., shareholder demands, political ideology)” 
(Herremans et al., 2009, p. 464).  The authors further document a substantial difference in the 
attitudes of leaders and laggards toward environmental reporting.  Leaders were shown to see it 
                                                
6 Herremans et al. (2009) also analyze changes in other environmental actions by the petroleum companies. 
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as “part of being transparent and engaging stakeholders,” whereas laggards “were unwilling to 
do anything not required as regulation and did not believe that reporting led to better 
management” (Herremans et al., 2009, p. 461).  Finally, and again relevant to institutional theory 
arguments, Herremans et al. also claim that the existence of only a weak industry association 
further added to the differentiation in response across firms.  
 Perhaps most relevant to our investigation, Bebbington et al. (2009) focus on six New 
Zealand companies that participated in a New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (NZBCSD) workshop series on initiating sustainable development reporting.  Data 
were gathered through (1) semi-structured interviews with workshop participants, (2) 
participation in, and observation of, the workshops themselves, and finally, (3) an interview with 
the workshop designer and facilitator.  Bebbington et al. (2009, p. 612) note that “a variety of 
regulative, normative, and cognitive institutions are exerting varying degrees of coercive, 
normative, and mimetic pressure on companies to report.”  However, while all of the sample 
participants noted coercive pressures, the source of these pressures varied across the NZBCSD, 
external ratings agencies, overseas suppliers, and the demands of owners.  Importantly, 
Bebbington et al. (2009, p. 612) also report “a more subtle interplay of normative and cognitive 
institutions at work.”  Finally, Bebbington et al. (2009, p. 613) claim that, while sustainable 
development reporting appears to be moving toward institutionalization, the content of what gets 
reported appears to be decoupled from broader concepts of CSR.  They note, for example, that 
rather than accountability or social justice, participants instead viewed the reporting as being 
about stakeholders, reputation, and risk. 
 .Although not exploring SER practices, several recent studies extend neo-institutional 
theory through examinations of organizational responses to institutional change.  For example, 
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Ezzamel et al. (2012) investigate differences in budgetary techniques across three different local 
education authorities in the U.K resulting from the introduction of a new business logic 
regarding budgeting practices.  They note (p. 284) that institutional logics consist of “linked 
material (practices) and symbolic (meanings) elements that work together to constitute a 
particular type of institutional order.”  Focusing on the micro-foundations of institutional change, 
Ezzamel et al. (2012, p. 301) document how differences in competing logics (e.g., differences in 
governmental make-up within the authority region) help to explain “different responses and 
understandings.”  From a slightly different perspective, Lepoutre and Valente (2012) perform a 
case analysis of nine firms engaged in the Belgian ornamental horticulture industry to assess 
what explains differences in the response to the introduction of a new logic focusing on 
“proactive environmental strategies and transparent reporting about organizational environmental 
impacts” (p. 289).  Based on their analysis, Lepoutre and Valente argue that while having 
organizational-level material structures conducive to the emerging logic are necessary for 
breaking away from the dominant logic of the industry, such change also requires what they refer 
to as “cognitive and symbolic immunity”.  They argue (pp. 302-303) that “the interplay among 
rules, norms, and commonly held beliefs, drives an organization to isomorphism with the 
dominant logic,” and therefore, unless managers framed the emerging logic “as part of an 
espoused future,” deviation did not occur.  Finally, and somewhat similar to Lepoutre and 
Valente (2012), Lander et al. (2013) explore differences in the conformity of mid-tier accounting 
firms to the movement in the profession from a trustee to a commercial logic.  They note (p. 138) 
“the two logics present contradicting demands on how firms should organize themselves in terms 
of strategy, structure, systems and processes,” and based on an analysis of 11 mid-tier firms in 
the Netherlands, Lander et al. report that while the companies generally retained a commitment 
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to the trustee logic, they found “great divergence in the practices these firms adopt and resist” (p. 
142).  In general, all three of the studies focusing on the impacts of institutional changes suggest 
that the emergence of competing logics does not uniformly lead to isomorphic behaviors and 
beliefs within the affected organizations.   
Our Investigation 
 
 The prior studies of SER from a neo-institutional perspective as well as the investigations 
focusing on changing institutional logics suggest that the theory provides a valuable lens through 
which to explore the practice of SER.  As such, given the substantial shift in government 
perspective (an emergent institutional logic) and the recent growth in CSR reporting in China, 
we attempt in this examination, using interview data and a qualitative analysis, to better 
understand Chinese managers’ perceptions of SER.  However, given the exploratory nature of 
our study and the possible confounding effects of different ownership structures and geographic 
locations, we limit our investigation to SOEs headquartered in Beijing. 
 We focus on SOEs both because they represent the dominant business form for publicly 
listed companies in China and because their unique relations with the government suggest 
potentially interesting institutional pressures for reporting.  According to Marquis and Qian 
(2014), as recently as 2008 more than 60 percent of the listed firms on the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai Stock Exchanges were SOEs (as opposed to privately controlled companies).  Marquis 
and Qian (2014, p. 129) also note that while the SOEs “have sold shares to outside investors, the 
government still maintains considerable ownership and control of these firms.”  They thus argue 
that SOEs, due to their government ownership, have more legitimacy with the state and would 
therefore be less likely to need to engage in SER as a means of seeking legitimacy.  In contrast to 
this expectation, however, their empirical investigation of CSR reporting over the 2006-2009 
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period finds that SOEs are just as likely to issue SERs as firms under private control.  They 
suggest that one possible explanation for this result is that the SOEs may be responding to 
control-based coercive pressure for reporting.  Interview-based data gathered from managers of 
SOEs thus allows us to explore whether the governmental coercive pressures, or other 
institutional-based pressures, potentially explain the CSR reporting by these organizations. 
    Finally, we focus on companies headquartered in Beijing to eliminate potential 
confounding effects of geographical differences.  Redfern and Crawford (2010, p. 222) note that 
the various regions of China are “culturally, politically, and historically diverse,” and these 
differences could potentially affect managerial perceptions of SER.  We focus on companies 
from Beijing partly because it is recognized as one of the leading economic centers in China 
(see, e.g., Lai, 2012; Sun and Wen, 2007), but more so due to our interest in the governmental 
influences on SER.  Zhao (2003, p. 556) argues that Beijing, as the traditional base of central 
government in China, offers companies headquartered there spatial advantages relative to their 
access to “regulatory information” which he claims is essential for doing business in China, and 
this could be expected to influence differences in the perception of institutional pressures for 
SER.   
 Overall, we seek answers to the following research questions: 
 
RQ1:  Do institutional pressures influence SER in China? 
 
RQ2:  Do managerial perceptions of the purposes for SER in China explain its low  





We focused our investigation on managers from SOEs headquartered in Beijing that had, 
as of 2009, engaged in CSR reporting.  In order to further reduce potential conflicts in the 
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interpretation of data, we limited our study to firms from the energy and banking and financial 
services industries.7  We identified potential interview participants’ names for initial contact 
from the sample organizations’ websites focusing on managers involved in the SER process.  
There were two key reasons for this selection criterion. First, we expected individuals at a 
managerial level to have a general knowledge of their organization’s operations and thus they 
were considered as being able to address the general interview questions. Second, because of 
their involvement in the process of initiating, preparing, or publishing the SERs, we believed 
they would have in-depth perceptions regarding the issue of CSR reporting, not only within their 
own firms, but within the broader Chinese context as well.  
Formal interview invitation letters were sent via email. The letters included a brief 
introduction of the interviewer’s background, together with a short description of the research 
study and the key topics to be addressed.   This allowed each potential participant the 
opportunity to consider the areas to be discussed in advance of the interviews and to ask for any 
clarification required.  Candidate organizations that failed to respond to the email were contacted 
by phone. Overall, 14 individuals from nine different organizations (five energy firms and four 
banking and financial services companies) agreed to participate in the study.8  All participants 
indicated they were involved in the SER process at their respective companies, and Table 1 
identifies the positions held by the interviewees. 
---------- Table 1 about here ---------- 
 
                                                
7 We chose these industry groups because one (energy) is typically considered to be more environmentally sensitive 
while the other (banking and financial services) is not, and prior research into SER consistently shows this industry 
classification appears to impact CSR reporting (see, e.g., Patten, 1991; 2002).  As we identify in our analysis of the 
interview data, however, we found little difference in perceptions of SER across the industry groups, in spite of 
recent findings that disclosure itself does vary across industry classification (both Ane, 2012 and Zeng et al., 2010, 
for example, present evidence that CSR reporting differs across industry groups in China).   
8 Due to our promise of anonymity, we refer to our sample organizations using only general references (i.e., E1, E2, 




All interviews were conducted in Chinese by the lead author, and all were carried out at 
the organizations’ corporate headquarters.  One interview took place during February of 2009 
and the rest were conducted over the period from June through September of that year.  This was 
the period of rapid growth in CSR reporting in China, and as such, we believe it to be an ideal 
time for gathering managerial perceptions of SER practices with respect to the changing 
institutional environment.  All interviews were face-to-face and semi-structured in nature, and 
they ranged from 50 minutes to one hour and 15 minutes in duration (except one interview, 
which lasted two hours and 30 minutes). The interviews were recorded and subsequently 
transcribed, and they focused primarily on (1) the perceived sources of pressures for companies 
to undertake SER, and (2) perceptions of the purposes for SER.  Extensive notes were also taken 
during, and immediately after, each of the interviews. 
Coding and Analysis 
Following transcription, the lead author read through the transcripts five different times 
focusing on identification of key themes, topics, and issues.  These were related back to the notes 
taken during the interview process leading to the development of narratives of how and why each 
sample company initiated SER practices.  Using matrices and charts (Miles and Huberman, 
1994), the lead author identified where similar constructs within the data emerged, and these 
themes, along with relevant supporting quotes from the respondents, were translated into 
English.  The coding, summarized points from each interview, and supporting quotes were then 
shared with the second member of the research team.  Following independent assessments of the 
data, the team members worked together in an iterative process (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007; 
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Albelda, 2011) to refine the evidence into meaningful classifications across the research 
questions explored.  
Interview Findings 
 Sources of Pressure for Reporting 
 
 Our initial research question focuses on understanding the role that institutional pressures 
play with respect to SER practices by SOEs in Beijing.  Based on the interviewee responses, it 
was apparent that managers from the sample firms were cognizant of the changing governmental 
pressures with respect to their social and environmental performance.  Particularly within the 
energy companies, the word ‘exposure’ was often repeated, and the need to conform to 
regulations was seen as a major concern.  For example, one of the energy firm representatives 
noted: 
 --- Operating in the highly sensitive energy industry is not easy.  Our operational 
practices are closely monitored by various regulations and standards [Organization E1].  
  
Another energy firm manager further stated that performing in accord with all environmental 
regulations was “the minimum we try to achieve” [Organization E5].  Importantly, the concerns 
with regulations were not limited to the energy firms.  One of the banking and financial services 
company interviewees acknowledged this: 
 --- Being a SOE, we keep ourselves informed of any changes in the relevant laws and 
 regulations as they could have a huge impact on us.  For instance, we could easily be 
 banned from borrowing or raising money on the capital market if behaviors damaging the 
 environment were spotted [Organization BF4]. 
 
 However, while almost all of the interview participants acknowledged, at least to some 
degree, governmental pressures, several of the managers attributed the source of this exposure as 
lying more with the general public.  For example, one energy company respondent noted: 
 --- Government may be an important influence, but behind it is the public.  For us, the  




Another firm representative stated: 
 
 --- We are one of the largest energy corporations in China.  Naturally [we are] more 
exposed to the general public.  I think most people believe that we have the ability to do 
more to be a better company.  Therefore, for some CSR regulations and guidelines, we  
would rather take it than ignorance [and I feel] the government expects us to do the exact  
same thing [Organization E1].  
 
 Although the government was consistently cited as a source of pressure for CSR 
performance, SOE managers unexpectedly did not see it as a source of coercive pressure for 
social and environmental reporting.  One of the banking and financial services company 
participants explicitly claimed: 
 --- I do not feel that we were really subjected to strong pressure from the government . . . 
 SER is an outcome of a company growing to a certain degree [Organization BF2].  
 
Similarly, an energy firm manager noted: 
 
 --- Our first [CSR] report was published . . . ahead of any government official guidelines 
or regulation.  In fact, for us, publishing the SER was not initially required by any 
governmental bodies.  Later on, we became aware of official SER guidelines and we are 
now following them, so I would say that the government issuing documents as such is a 
direction rather than pressure, at least on companies like ours [Organization E3].  
 
This view of the government as a facilitator was often tied to the nature of the firms as being 
SOEs and this was reiterated by a number of the sample participants.  Further, this role as a 
facilitator was not limited to the practice of SER, but included other aspects of CSR activities as 
well, and these, in turn seem to have helped in the development of SER for at least some firms.  
For example, a participant from an energy organization noted his firm’s participation in a CSR 
management pilot program that preceded publication of the company’s first SER: 
 --- As a SOE, we were inspired by the government to participate in the pilot project 
 which made us realize that our CSR goals should be aligned with our actions 




The manager went on to explain that he believed the progress in overall CSR management was 
an important step toward the initiation of CSR reporting.   
 This is not to say that SOE managers perceived no coercive pressures for CSR reporting.  
Indeed, within the banking and financial services industry, representatives from all four firms 
cited the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) as a source of coercive pressure. The 
CRBC has been active in promoting SER activities, and in 2007, held a conference meeting with 
the Big Four Chinese national banks to promote the idea of publishing SERs.  As stated by one 
of the firm managers: 
 --- By attending the meeting, we definitely sensed the need of publishing reports [SERs].  
 I am not saying it was mandatory, but it was something that the CBRC wanted us all to 
 do [Organization BF3]. 
 
Participants from all four banking and financial services companies also cited the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange’s “Social Responsibility Guidelines for Listed Companies” (issued in 2006) as 
likely being one of the triggers for the rapid increase in the publication of SERs in China.  
  Rather than coercive pressures from the government and other sources as the primary 
driver of CSR reporting by the sample of SOEs in Beijing, managers from both industry groups 
identified affiliations with other companies as a major source of both guidance and pressure 
regarding SER.  Indeed, during the interviews, one of the most frequently used words was ‘peer’.  
As noted by one of the energy firm participants: 
 --- It is important for us to be aware of what is happening in other organizations and in 
 the industry as a whole [Organization E2]. 
 
However, no clear picture emerged as to whether the industry affiliations could be considered 
more normative or more mimetic in nature.  Within the energy firms, for example, several 
participants noted the supportive role the industry offered with respect to reporting.  For instance, 
one manager stated: 
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 --- This sector has, and has had for a long time, a focus on dealing with social and  
 environmental issues.  Since 2005, there have been a lot of discussions [on SER 
 practices].  However, to publish SERs was never mandatory [Organization E4].  
 
Such a view would appear to support a normative interpretation of the institutional pressures.  
But in contrast, there were also instances where mimetic isomorphism clearly played a role.  For 
example, the representative from an energy firm noted: 
 --- We were one of the first [companies] to report.  However, what we could see was that, 
 although our Chinese peers did not publish SERs, our international peers such as BP and  
 Shell were very actively involved in disclosing social and environmental information.   
 Frankly speaking, from top to bottom throughout our company, we have been taught that  
 we are trying to be a world class corporation in our industrial sector.  Therefore, learning 
 from other international competitors has become a major task for us.  We have studied the  
 reports of BP and Shell over the past few years [Organization E1]. 
 
Further reflecting mimetic tendencies, the manager from another of the energy companies 
specifically noted that their initiation of SER practices had been influenced by Organization E1’s 
first report, largely because it had been praised by the central government.   
 Within the banking and financial services sector, interview data also indicates evidence of 
both mimetic and normative pressures for CSR reporting.  With respect to the former, one of the 
sample participants noted: 
 --- When you are trying to be the best, you ought to seek to match the performances of 
 the companies which are doing well, and most of them produce SERs, so we need to do 
 the same [Organization BF2]. 
 
Echoing a similar sentiment, another banking and financial services respondent stated: 
 
 
 --- We realized that the need for SER practices was increasing dramatically, and the Big  
 Four banks consequently published their SERs.  We wanted to be one of the best 
 organizations in the industry and to learn from the best practices.  Therefore, I believe 
 that gave us the inspiration to produce our first report [Organization BF1]. 
 
 However, the industry influences on SER within the banking and financial services sector 
also had normative elements.  Respondents from all four sample organizations highlighted the 
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role that industry associations, particularly the CRBC and the China Banking Association (CBA), 
played with respect to offering formal education on CSR topics including the promotion of SER 
practices. To illustrate, the CBA helped to organize an annual CSR convention to allow firms to 
share their experiences with respect to SER.  One of the firm managers noted this stating: 
 --- The CBA invited us to work together on the [CSR] convention after our first SER was 
 published.  Our initial purpose was to promote CSR and SER and, over the years, we  
 have seen significant results in the number of CSR reporters and the many organizations 
 that take part in various CSR activities [Organization BF3]. 
 
 Finally, it is important to note that interview participants also identified peer influences 
arising from other SOEs (not necessarily located in the same industry or even the same 
geographic zone).  An energy firm manager stated, for example: 
 --- We are one of the largest natural energy organizations in China.  In our mind, we like  
 to consider ourselves a state-owned company when doing things.  This is one of the 
 reasons why we not only take into account what happens within our industry but also the 
 issues that emerge from other SOEs [Organization E5]. 
 
Representatives from this firm went on to acknowledge that it was the issuance of SERs by other 
SOEs, and not just energy industry companies, that inspired them to publish their own report.  
However, in general, interviewees tended to see the pressures from SOEs as being less direct 
than the pressures arising from their peers within the same industries. 
Purpose for Reporting 
 With respect to our second research question, a major observation emerging from our 
analysis of interview data is that managers in SOEs in Beijing were very consistent in their 
perceptions of the purpose for CSR reporting, but that they tended to see it differently when 
discussing SERs from their own firms as opposed to those of other companies.  Almost all of the 
organizational participants believed that SERs represented a good way for their companies to 
deal with high expectations/pressures, and perhaps owing to the belief that the public was a 
major source of pressure for CSR performance, many of the managers indicated that the 
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reporting was particularly important for targeting that audience.  One manager stated, for 
example: 
 --- public perception is very important for our company and we are trying our best to 
 build a positive public image” [Organization E4]. 
   
Interestingly, when discussing their own firms’ use of SERs, almost all of the interviewees 
expressed the belief that the reporting was needed to communicate the message that the 
companies were positively engaged in social and environmental activities.   For example, the 
interviewee from one of the energy firms claimed: 
 --- We have been acting in line with the CSR agenda for a long time and, at the time [of 
 producing their first report], the task was to report this, and to do so in a way that people 
could easily understand [Organization E1]. 
 
Similarly, the representative of another organization stated: 
 
 --- It had reached the point where we realized we needed to send out a message.  Doing 
 things in silence just didn’t work anymore.  That’s when we thought about publishing  
 SERs [Organization E5]. 
 
This representative further added “publishing SERs is a way for us to manage and to disclose our 
CSR activities” [Organization E5].  This perception was not limited to the energy company 
managers.  A representative of one of the banking and financial services firms claimed, for 
example: 
--- [CSR reporting] is a formal and systematic instrument for others to understand what  
 we are doing, and it is the right way to do it [Organization BF3]. 
 
 Unfortunately, and this may help explain the low quality of disclosure identified in 
virtually all of the quantitative assessments of CSR reporting in China, while the respondents 
seemed to believe the reporting was necessary to communicate a message about the firms’ 
underlying CSR activities, none of the managers addressed the potential of the reports for 
providing transparent and meaningful social and environmental data that would allow users to 
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assess performance across firms.  Further, several of the participants did acknowledge the 
potential for the reports to be used in disingenuous ways, but only when discussing the reporting 
as it applied to other firms.  As stated by a banking and financial services manager, “there are 
people out there who use it [SER] as a marketing strategy for promoting their service or 
products” [Organization BF 4].  One of the energy firm participants identified a different 
concern: 
 --- I think there possibly are some organizations that do as little as possible [in terms of 
CSR practices], but are just good with clever words.  Is anything actually as good 




 Our first research question centered on managers’ perceptions of pressures regarding 
SER.  Higgins and Larrinaga (2014, p. 281), in their recent overview of institutional theory and 
its relation to SER, address how the practice “can be regarded as resting on a range of 
intersecting regulatory, normative, and cognitive institutional pressures,” and they illustrate this 
point with examples from, almost exclusively, the more developed Western world.  They note, 
for example, that regulatory pressures emanating from the European Union’s Eco-Management 
and Audit Scheme influenced the spread of environmental reporting in Europe, while seemingly 
voluntary actions such as becoming signatories to the United Nations’ Global Compact are often 
a result of the normative pressures “spread through professionalization, formal education, and 
professional networks” (Higgins and Larrinaga, 2014, pp. 277-278). Finally, they also note ( p. 
279) that, while “the existence of cognitive structures can be difficult to prove empirically,” both 
the growth of standalone reporting amongst the world’s largest firms and the adoption of GRI 
stand as evidence of practices that have “become ‘normal’ and ‘taken-for-granted’” leading to 
mimetic behavior across companies. 
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  In spite of the differing political and market development in China, the SOE managers 
we interviewed clearly see similar aspects of institutional pressure as influencing the adoption 
and growth of SER in their own country.  Regulatory guidance from both the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, as well as the desire for reporting from the CBA were both 
specifically cited as coercive pressures of a regulatory nature.  Further, and particularly within 
the banking and financial services industry, the managers expressed a sense of normative 
pressure resulting from both the educational efforts of industry organizations, but also from peer 
institutions including other SOEs in other industry settings. And while, as of 2009, the managers 
may not have explicitly expressed SER as a taken-for-granted activity, they certainly interpreted 
the actions of peer institutions as bringing pressures on their organizations to adopt the practice.  
Importantly, and consistent with the findings of Bebbington et al. (2009) regarding institutional 
pressures in New Zealand, the Chinese managers seemed to perceive a subtle interplay of the 
coercive, normative, and mimetic forces at play with respect to the adoption and development of 
SER within their firms.  Accordingly, it appears that, even within China’s differing social-
economic context, institutional theory provides a rich lens for understanding SER practices. 
 However, it is important to highlight that the interviews also revealed findings that were 
somewhat unexpected.  Perhaps foremost among these is that, contrary to the conjectures of 
Marquis and Qian (2014), the interviewees from the SOEs in Beijing did not view the 
government as exerting substantial coercive pressures for CSR reporting.  Instead, the state was 
seen as playing more of a facilitating role.  One possible explanation for this perception by the 
managers is that, as noted by Marquis and Qian (2014, p. 145), almost all of the government-
issued directives use language such as ‘guidelines/guides’, ‘recommended practices’, and 
‘outlines’, as opposed to ‘policies’ or ‘enforcement/regulations’. As such, managers may 
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perceive them as lacking coercive force.  Alternatively, the interviewees’ view that government 
plays a more normative role with respect to SER could be a function of the unique nature of 
SOEs as quasi-governmental organizations (Gao, 2011).  Marquis and Qian, (2014, p. 129) note, 
for example, that “the government still maintains considerable ownership and control of these 
firms,” and accordingly, the line between internal ownership and outside regulatory pressures is 
likely not distinct.   
 In contrast to our expectation that regulatory pressures from government would be a 
primary driver of SER within the Chinese firms, our interviews instead suggest that the dominant 
source of pressures for the practice seems to emanate largely from peer institutions.  And while 
several interview participants identified SOEs from outside of their industry as having impacted 
SER practices, the peer influences were substantially stronger within the industry groups.  
Particularly interesting in this regard, the heavily cited influence of industry associations within 
the banking and financial services sector stands in sharp contrast to the situation cited by 
Herremans et al. (2009) for the Canadian petroleum industry. 
 Our second research question focused on the Beijing managers’ perceptions of the 
purpose for CSR reporting, and a major finding is that almost all interviewees believed it was 
important for communicating a message about firms’ social and environmental initiatives.  
Importantly, the audience for that message was often stated as the public in general.  The concern 
that these perceptions raise is that managers view the reporting as a tool of image enhancement 
as opposed to a medium for providing transparent information to allow users to assess actual 
social and environmental performance across firms, and this may help to explain the low quality 
of reporting documented in assessments of the disclosure.9  For example, Guan and Yu (2011) 
                                                
9 Of course, it is important to note that similar concerns have been levied against CSR reporting in Western contexts. 
For example, Spence (2009, p. 209) notes that CSR disclosure has been criticized for cherry picking good news, 
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noted one of their concerns with the quality of reporting was the low inclusion of performance 
indicators, and supporting this claim, Liu and Anbumozhi (2009, p. 597) indicate that disclosure 
of “type, quantity, and destination of emissions and effluents” was the category of information 
provided by the fewest companies in their sample (only about 10 percent of the firms did so).  If 
managers view CSR reports as a vehicle for enhancing their public image, it seems unlikely that 
they will choose to provide metrics that may portray their performance in a negative light.  Again 
similar to Bebbington et al. (2009), this suggests that in China, as in New Zealand, the reporting 
has been decoupled from broader concepts of CSR.  It is also interesting that, when discussing 
their own firms’ use of the disclosure, the managers uniformly focused on its benefit for 
informing users of actual aspects of their companies’ social and environmental impacts, but 
several of the participants, when reflecting on reporting by other firms, recognized its potential to 
be used in manipulative and misleading ways.10   
 Given the findings discussed above, we believe that improving the quality of CSR 
reporting in China may depend on changing managers’ perceptions of its purpose.  As long as the 
practice is seen primarily as a tool for projecting a positive image of companies’ social and 
environmental impacts, it seems unlikely that firms will ever be willing to meaningfully disclose, 
in a transparent way, their real CSR performance.  Changing these attitudes, however, will likely 
be difficult.  However, we also believe that our analysis regarding the pressures managers see for 
SER suggests two potentially important ways for moving in that direction.  First, given the 
finding that industry associations were viewed as major sources of both coercive and normative 
                                                                                                                                                       
ignoring “more fundamental social issues such as wealth redistribution, [and refusing] to undertake overall 
environmental impact analysis, instead preferring to focus on disaggregated data and efficiency measures.”  Cho et 
al. (2012), focusing on stand-alone CSR reporting in the U.S., thus refer to the reports as tools of image 
enhancement. 
  




pressures, it seems apparent that they should continue to provide guidance and support for SER, 
but should push companies to move toward adoption of more comprehensive measures of social 
and environmental performance, such as those proffered by the Global Reporting Initiative.  
Second, the perceived lack of coercive pressures from the government for SER practices suggests 
that more authoritative pronouncements might be necessary to better send the message that the 
reporting needs to reflect more relevant and meaningful measures of companies’ social and 
environmental performance. 
  Finally, it is worth noting that the large degree of homogeneity we found across the 
managers’ perceptions regarding both the pressures for, and the purposes of SER stands in 
contrast to the findings of the explorations of institutional change in other settings.  Indeed, 
rather than instances of nonconformity, we find instead almost uniform acceptance of the push 
for SER.  And while this may help to explain the explosive growth of the practice in China over 
the mid-2000s, it also may reflect the substantial differences in the social/political arrangement in 
China vis-à-vis the European settings explored in Ezzamel et al. (2012), Lepoutre and Valente 
(2012), and Lander et al. (2013).  As noted by Sheng et al. (2011, p. 3), “the Chinese government 
still controls a significant portion of scarce resources, such as land, bank loans, subsidies and tax 
breaks,” and accordingly, being perceived by government officials or agencies as engaging in 
actions that are “desirable and proper” are important for firms’ legitimacy with the state.  Thus 
the top-down emphasis on SER through the government and other quasi-state organizations such 
as the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges may be more effective in inducing conformity 
across actors than would be the case in other settings.  Of course, our focus on SOEs 
headquartered in Beijing may further amplify this effect given the closer ties these organizations 




The exploration of the motivational factors behind CSR reporting practices is an 
important research tradition within the social and environmental accounting literature (O’Dwyer 
and Owen, 2005), but, to date, the investigations have focused almost exclusively on the more 
developed Western world.   In this study, we extend prior research by examining the managerial 
perception of social and environmental reporting practices in China. Owing largely to a shift in 
governmental emphasis, Chinese company SER grew dramatically over the mid-2000s, and our 
intent was to better understand company perceptions regarding the practice.  Following other 
recent investigations of corporate reporting (e.g., Bebbington et al., 2009; Herremans et al., 
2009), we applied the lens of neo-institutional theory to gain insights into the initiation of SER 
practices in the Chinese setting.  
 Based on interviews with managers from nine different SOEs headquartered in Beijing, 
our analysis suggests that, similar to CSR reporting in more developed economies, a variety of 
coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures interplay to influence the practice in the Chinese 
SOEs.  The managers cited regulatory pressure for reporting from, for example, industry 
associations and other quasi-governmental organizations including the country’s primary stock 
exchanges.  Interestingly, however, the government itself was seen by the managers as more of a 
facilitator of SER than as a source of coercive pressure.  Normative and mimetic pressures, 
particularly those arising from peer organizations, were also cited as major influences on the 
adoption of SER by our sample managers.  Further, and potentially explaining the low quality of 
reporting documented in prior studies (e.g., Guan and Yu, 2001; Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009; Yu 
et al., 2011), we found that the managers almost uniformly see the purpose of CSR disclosure as 
being about image enhancement.  Ultimately, improving the reporting, therefore, may require 
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inculcating a different message about what CSR reporting should be about, and given the unique 
nature of the relationship between SOEs and the government, we believe that the government 
and its organizations must be the primary source of that message.  However, because the 
managers we interviewed perceived the public as the ultimate source of pressure for 
improvements in their social and environmental performance, we believe society itself must also 
play a role in stressing the need for better company accountability. Accomplishing that in an 
environment where social expressions are still closely guarded, however, may prove difficult.   
 Like all studies, ours is subject to limitations.  We explore the perceptions of managers 
from a limited number of similar firms, and as such, the degree to which our findings generalize 
to other companies cannot be assessed.  Further, our findings that managerial perceptions tend to 
be fairly uniform across our two industry groups suggests that status as an SOE and/or being 
headquartered in Beijing may play a greater function than industry membership in the formation 
of organizational fields (see, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) within the Chinese setting. While 
beyond the scope of our investigation, more detailed analysis of the formation and existence of 
organizational fields in China would be potentially enlightening. Similarly, given the historic, 
cultural, and economic differences across regions of China (Redfern and Crawford, 2010), as 
well as the differences in governmental ties for privately controlled firms relative to the SOEs, 
exploring the perceptions of managers from other regions and for other types of firms in China 
could potentially also yield interesting results. 
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Table 1 – Positions held by interviewees. 
 
Interviewee Position in the Company 
BF1 Manager of the CSR reporting team 
BF2-a Deputy head of Corporate Strategy and Investor Relations Department 
BF2-b Manager of Risk Management Department 
BF3 Officer from Executive Office 
BF4 Manager from the Marketing Department 
E1-a General secretary from the Executive Office 
E1-b Manager from the Corporate Strategy Department 
E2 Assistant to the CEO 
E3-a Manager in charge of preparing CSR reports 
E3-b Assistant manager from the General Office 
E4-a Manager from the Department of Public Relations 
E4-b Assistant manager from the General Office 
E5-a Officer in charge of preparing CSR reports 
E5-b Assistant manager from Department of Corporate Culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
